Table of Contents

I.        Table of Cases and Authorities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

II.       Statement of the Case. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

III.    Questions Presented. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

IV.     Statement of Facts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

V.       Argument. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11

           A.       State courts have no constitutional authority to “opt out” of a federal law and may not reject state court jurisdiction over private TCPA actions unless barred by a neutral rule of court administration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

                      1. TCPA background related to unsolicited fax advertisements.. . . . . . . . . 11

2. The Supremacy Clause of the U. S. Constitution and the Maryland Declaration of Rights compel state courts to hear actions brought under federal statutes, including the TCPA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13

3. Congressional intent to limit state court jurisdiction over enforcement actions brought under federal statutes, on substantive grounds, rather than neutral rules of court administration, must be “unmistakably clear”. . . . . . .16

4. The TCPA’s “if otherwise permitted” language refers to neutral rules or laws governing court administration and procedures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

5. The Tenth Amendment Poses No Problem To Congressional Creation Of A Private Right Actionable In State Court. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

B. Even if the TCPA were read to allow states to reject the TCPA’s private cause of action for facsimile violations, Maryland has made no such rejection.. . 25

1. Maryland has not rejected TCPA jurisdiction in state courts . . . . . . . . . 25

2. The absence of a state “counterpart” statute does not diminish the

                      viability of private enforcement actions under the TCPA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29

3. The CSA misapplied the principles of legislative interpretation and failed to harmonize the TCPA and the Maryland fax statute.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31

VI.     Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36

Appendix. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  App. 1

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES

Case                                                                                                     Cited at pages:

Allied Vending Inc., v. City of Bowie, 332 Md. 279 (1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32

Amalgamated Cas. Ins. Co. v. Helms, 239 Md. 529 (1965). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Autoflex Leasing, Inc. v. Mfrs. Auto Leasing, Inc., 16 S. W. 3d 815 (2000). . . . . . . . 25-27

Biggus v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 328 Md. 188 (1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Levitt v. Fax.com, Inc. et al., CA No. 21, Sept. Term, 2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 3, 4

Catonsville Nursing Home, Inc. v. Loveman, 349 Md. 560 (1998). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32

C&C Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17

Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. v. Dir. of Fin., 343 Md. 567 (1996). . . . . . . . . . . . . .33

Cicoria v. State, 332 Md. 21, 629 A.2d 742 (1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33, 34

Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130 (1876) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19, 22, 24, 29

Deibler v. State, 365 Md. 185 (2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Dep’t. Of Econ. and Employ. Dev. v. Taylor, 108 Md. App. 250

aff’d, 344 Md. 687 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Destination Ventures v. FCC, 844 F. Supp. 632 (D. Or. 1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Destination Ventures v. FCC, 46 F. 3d 54 (9th Cir.1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Douglas v. New York. N.H. & H.R. Co., 279 U.S. 377, 73 L.Ed.747 (1929). . . . . . . . . . . . .  16, 19

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES

Case                                                                                                     Cited at pages:

Felland Limited Partnership v. Digi-Tel Communications, LLC, et al., CA No. 20 . . . . . 2

Frost v. State, 336 Md. 125 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473 (1981). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14

Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106 (1940) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19

Hooters v. Nicholson, 245 Ga. App. 363, 537 S.E. 2d 468, (2000),

reconsid. den’d January 19, 2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27

Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 110 L.Ed.2d 332 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15, 16, 19-22

International Science & Tech. Inst., Inc. v. Inacom Commun., Inc.,

106 F.3d 1146 (4th Cir.1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20, 22-24, 27, 28

Kaplan v. Democrat & Chronicle, 698 N.Y.S.2d 799 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) . . . . . . . . . .27

Kenro v. Fax Daily, 904 F. Supp. 912, and 962 F. Supp.1162 (S.D. Ind. 1995) . . . . . . . . 12

Kilroy v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. App 4^th 793 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Lewis v. State, 348 Md. 648 (1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 577 (1978). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Maine v. Taylor 477 U.S. 131, 139 (1986). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17

Martin v. Beverage Capital Corp., 353 Md. 388 (1999). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Marriott Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 346 Md. 437 (1997). 32

Marzullo v. Kahl, 135 Md. App. 663, 763A.2d 1217 (2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES (continued)

Case                                                                                                     Cited at pages:

McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18 (1990). . 14

McKnett v. St. Louis & San Francisco R. Co., 292 U.S. 230 (1934). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Minneapolis & St.Louis R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. at 222. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Missouri ex rel. Southern R. Co. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1 (1950). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19

Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 56 L.Ed. 327 (1912). . . . . . .15, 20, 21

Montgomery County v. Buckman, 333 Md. 516 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33

New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23, 24

R.A. Ponte Architects, Ltd. v. Investors Alert, Inc., 149 Md. App 219 (2003). . . . . . Passim

Reynolds v. Diamond Foods, 79 S.W.3d 907 (Mo. 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Robinson v. Bunch, 367 Md. 432, 788 A. 2d 636 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14, 21, 22

Schulman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 710 N.Y.S.2d 368 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21

Schuman, Kane, Felts & Everngam, Chartered v. Aluisi, 341 Md. 115 (1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 23 S. Ct. 518 (2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31

State v. Thompson, 332 Md. 1 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15, 21, 22, 29, 30, 32

United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17, 18, 28

United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES (continued)

Case                                                                                                     Cited at pages:

Will v. Michigan, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16, 17

Worsham v. Nationwide, 138 Md. App. 487, 772 A. 2d 868 (2001),

cert. denied, 365 Md. 268, 778 A. 2d 383 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25, 27, 29

Zelma v. Total Remodeling, Inc., 778 A.2d 591 (N.J. App., 2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

STATUTES

Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Passim

Annotated Code of Maryland, Commercial Law Article §14-1313. . . . . . 29, 30, 34, 35, 37

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

U.S. Constitution, Article VI, clause 2 (Supremacy Clause). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Passim

U.S. Constitution, Tenth Amendment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18, 22-24

Maryland Declaration of Rights, Article 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13, 14, 34, 36

TREATISES AND LAW REVIEW ARTICLES

Robert Biggerstaff, State Courts and the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991:

Must States Opt-in? Can States Opt-out?, 33 Conn. L. Rev. 404 (2001). . . . . . . . . . . . .19

Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law (1954)

54 Colum. L. Rev. 489, 5081) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19

Wright, Miller & Cooper, 13 Federal Practice and Procedure, §3526 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

RULES

Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 56.1(b)(1).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26

OTHER AUTHORITIES

135 Cong. Rec. E1462 (daily ed. May 2, 1989).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

137 Cong. Rec. S9840-02 and S16207 (daily ed. July 11 and Nov. 7, 1991).. . . . . . . . . . 12

H.R. Rep. No. 317.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13

S. Rep. No. 102-178 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N.1968.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

II.      STATEMENT OF THE CASE

           Plaintiff/Petitioner, Bruce Levitt, filed a class action complaint on May 7, 2001 against Fax.com, Inc., Kevin Katz, Charles Martin and JD&T Enterprises, Inc. alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, and related FCC regulations. On July 27, 2001 the court granted Plaintiff’s motion to preserve records. E-5, E-25. On September 24, 2001 Petitioner filed an amended class action complaint against Fax.com, Inc. and JD&T Enterprises, Inc., dismissing Messrs. Katz and Martin from the suit. R. at Docket #00013000. On Sep. 27, 2001 the circuit court granted a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction filed by these same individual Defendants, but on Nov. 11, 2001 the court granted Petitioner’s Motion to Vacate that Sep. 27 order as moot. R. at Docket #0014000.

           In response to discovery motions filed by Plaintiff, the court issued orders on May 13, 2002 compelling Defendants to produce documents (E-28), and on June 12, 2002 requiring Defendants to produce knowledgeable designees to testify at deposition. E-30. On November 27, 2002 the court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order denying the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, and on December 10, 2002 issued a Revised Memorandum Opinion also denying the motion for summary judgment. E-12, E-106.

           On December 24, 2002 the court issued an order granting Plaintiff’s motion for class certification and appointing Plaintiff’s counsel as class counsel. R. at Docket no. 0067003.

           On February 6, 2003, following the issuance of the opinion in R.A. Ponte Architects, Ltd. v. Investors’ Alert, Inc., No. 537, Sept. Term 2001, 149 Md. App. 219 (filed January 29, 2003) (Ponte) the court granted Defendants’ renewed motion for summary judgment. E-127. By Order dated April 9, 2003, the court denied Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. E-17; R. at Docket #0100004. The April 9, 2003 Order required all references to information exchanged between the parties in connection with settlement discussions to be struck from the record.

           The Orders and rulings of February 6 and April 9, 2003 were dispositive as to all issues. On May 6, 2003 Petitioner filed a notice of appeal. R. at Docket # 0103000. On June 3, 2003, before any briefs were filed in the Court of Special Appeals, Defendants/Respondents filed a petition for certiorari, which was granted by order of this court dated June 12, 2003.

           Certiorari has been granted in the following related cases, all of which were brought under the unsolicited facsimile provisions of the TCPA, and have been combined for argument with the instant case:

1.        Felland Limited Partnership v. Digi-Tel Communications, LLC, et al., CA No. 20, September Term, 2003, appeal from Circuit Court for Montgomery County. The circuit court in Felland granted summary judgment and dismissed on March 21, 2002, finding no private cause of action in the Maryland courts for private TCPA fax suits, lack of agency under respondeat superior, and unconstitutionality under the eighth amendment due to “excessive fines” posed by TCPA class actions.

2.        R.A. Ponte Architects, Ltd. v. Investors’ Alert, Inc., No. 537, Sept. Term 2001, 149 Md. App. 219 (filed January 29, 2003), appeal from the Circuit Court for Montgomery County (Case # 215514V). This class action complaint was dismissed on April 12, 2001 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction for TCPA private actions in state courts. Appeal was taken to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed on January 29, 2003.

           The Court issued a notice that this case and all of the companion cases will be

argued on October 2, 2003 at 9:30 AM.

III.     QUESTIONS PRESENTED

           1.        Whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that a state has the constitutional authority to “opt out” of the federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (TCPA).

           2.        Whether Congress provided an unmistakably “clear statement” to alter the traditional federal-state constitutional balance and permit states to choose to “opt out” of their obligation to hear private cases under the TCPA.

           3.        Whether, assuming Maryland has the constitutional authority to “opt out” of the TCPA and that Congress provided an unmistakably “clear statement” of intent to allow a state to “opt out,” the Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that Maryland in fact did choose to “opt out” of the TCPA.

IV.     STATEMENT OF FACTS

Agreed Statement of Facts in Lieu of Transcript

           Petitioner, Bruce Levitt, an attorney in private practice in Maryland, received allegedly unsolicited advertisements via facsimile promoting the products and services of Respondent JD& T Enterprises, Inc. a California corporation that conducts business under the name “Travel To Go,” and sells travel services, which it allegedly advertised through Respondent Fax.com, Inc., by sending advertisements via facsimile. Fax.com, Inc. a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in California, is engaged in the business of sending advertisements by facsimile on behalf of others to facsimile numbers throughout the Unites States, including Maryland.

            Levitt filed this suit as a class action under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C) in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against JD&T Enterprises, Inc. and Fax.com, Inc. seeking statutory damages of $500 per violation, or up to $1500 for each violation found to be the result of knowing or willful conduct. Class certification was granted via order dated December 24, 2002. Respondents’ motion for summary judgment was initially denied via order dated November 27, 2002, but was renewed after the Court of Special Appeals issued its opinion in R. A. Ponte Architects, LTD v. Investors’ Alert, Inc., No. 537, Sept. Term 2001, 149 Md. App. 219 (filed January 29, 2003), and was granted via order dated February 3, 2003 based solely on the interpretation of the law in Ponte. Petitioner noted an appeal from the judgments entered pursuant to that order. Respondents filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which was granted via order dated June 12, 2003.

Supplemental Statement of Facts

           Petitioner provides the following supplemental statement of facts to complement the Agreed Statement of Facts in Lieu of Transcript, pursuant to Rules 8-501(g) and 8-411. Mindful that the rules call for a concise statement of facts, and that the issue before the Court is one of law, Petitioner observes that if the Court is to consider the public interests at stake, additional background from the record on the nature of Respondents’ business is needed.

The Advertisements

           On January 24, February 14, and February 21, 2001, Petitioner, Bruce Levitt, received advertisements via facsimile for which he did not give Respondents prior express permission or invitation. E-46. These advertisements, copies of which were attached to both the original complaint and the Amended Class Action Complaint as exhibits A, B and C, promote travel packages priced at $349 per person, and solicit calls to 800-208-9641 for travel reservations. E-22-24. The number 800-457-5410 is printed to request deletion from an unidentified fax number database. These advertisements do not identify the fax sender (broadcaster) or the entity whose products or services they promote.

JD&T Enterprises, Inc.

           Respondent JD&T Enterprises, Inc. is a provider of travel services based in California using the trade name “Travel to Go.” E-32-33. JD&T retained Creative Marketing Concepts, Inc. (CMC) to provide marketing services including fax broadcasting. Ms. Bunn (of JD&T) met with Neil Lipsky (of CMC) and Kevin Katz (of Fax.com) at Ms. Bunn’s office to discuss using Fax.com as a fax broadcaster of JD&T’s advertisements. Ms. Bunn later visited Fax.com to see its operation and spoke with Mr. Katz several times by phone. See Memorandum in Support of Petitioner’s Motion for Sanctions for Respondents’ Violations of Court Orders and for Other Relief, filed September 6, 2002, R. at Docket #0078000 at p. 11.

           JD&T says the method for determining whether any particular travel ad is from JD&T is to call the reservation number and ask whether the caller has reached JD&T/ “Travel to Go.” E-34-35. Petitioner Levitt followed this procedure and called a series of telephone numbers on August 9, 2002, including 800-766-9450, 888-626-2311, 888-626-6608, and 800-620-3820. The individuals who answered the calls to each of these numbers told Mr. Levitt he had reached Travel to Go. E-37-38. These same reservation telephone numbers appear on several other fax advertisements in addition to those attached to the complaints (E-53-58), and were received by Mr. Levitt and other recipients in Maryland. E-44-45; E-59-68. Thus, there are several formats and layouts of JD&T ads that were faxed into Maryland in addition to the exhibits attached to the complaints. According to the FCC, Fax.com can be identified as the fax broadcaster of any given advertisement by referring to the removal number, relying on the FCC’s table of “Fax.com Advertisers and Associated Opt-out Numbers.” E-103-105. This method likewise confirms that Fax.com is the sender of the advertisements at E-53-58, as well as those attached to the complaints.

           Despite the court order of July 27, 2001 requiring preservation of relevant documents, as of July, 2002 JD&T continued to shred documents as they reached the age of one year, and never considered modifying its shredding policy. R. at Docket #0078000 at p. 14.

           JD&T hired three marketing firms in sequence: Millenium Travel during the summer of 2000, CMC from November, 2000 to June, 2001, and Platinum Travel from June, 2001 to at least July, 2002 (R. at Docket #0078000, p. 16), and paid them commissions of 70% of gross sales (Id., p. 17). On hiring each, JD&T contemplated that fax broadcasting would be included. The marketing contract between JD&T and CMC provides that CMC is required to handle problems related to faxing, and pay fines for “violations.” Id., p. 16 Weekly sales records were kept, but were never produced in discovery. Id. The price of $349 in the JD&T advertisements was determined jointly by JD&T and CMC., R. at Docket #0078000, p. 14. According to Ms. Bunn, the marketing side of JD&T Enterprises, Inc. generates almost no paper or electronic records, and whatever is generated has either been shredded or accidentally lost via computer failure, with no backup. Id. at 15.

Fax.com, Inc.

           Fax.com, Inc. is a fax broadcaster, transmitting messages to telephone facsimile machines on behalf of others for a fee. It specializes in faxing to numbers contained in its database which it touts as “the industry’s largest fax number database” at 16 million, to be increased by another 16 million “soon.” E-85. In 2000 and 2001 Fax.com received six citations from the FCC for apparent violations of the TCPA for sending unsolicited advertisements via facsimile. E-27, Items 1-6; E-86-87. Despite those citations, Fax.com continued to send unsolicited advertisements via facsimile. E-87. Recent advertisements faxed by Fax.com and tracked by the FCC include some from Travel to Go. E-105. The FCC has confirmed that these ads were sent by Fax.com. E-88. Ads faxed by Fax.com, Inc. have created significant disruption and inconvenience to the recipients (E-88-89), routinely fail to identify Fax.com or the advertiser, and result in complaints by recipients about unsuccessful requests to be deleted from Fax.com’s database. E-90. Those reaching Fax.com have encountered hostility, misrepresentation and unresponsiveness. E-90-91. The FCC considers Fax.com a fax sender and not a mere disinterested fax broadcaster. E-92. The FCC concluded:

“. . . Fax.com uses its own extensive distribution list of telephone facsimile numbers to send its clients’ advertisements, and... knowingly sends advertisements to such numbers without regard to whether the facsimile machine owner or responsible party either granted permission to send the advertisement or had an established business relationship with the advertiser of Fax.com. In addition, Fax.com apparently reviews the text of its client’s advertisements, not only to assist with graphic design, but also to assess content. Such conduct is clear evidence Fax.com’s high degree of involvement in the unlawful activity. Moreover, the staff’s citations provided Fax.com with actual notice that its fax broadcasting activities do not comply with federal law.” E-92-93.

“The FCC has determined that Fax.com’s primary business activity is itself a massive on-going violation of Section 227 (b)(1)(C) of the act and Section 64.1200 (a)(3) of the Commission’s rules, and Fax.com is well aware of this fact. Fax.com’s primary commercial offering is a fax broadcasting service that clearly does not comply with federal restrictions governing facsimile advertisements. ... We conclude that this unlawful undertaking merits maximum forfeitures for each of the violations at issue here.” E-95.

           The FCC imposed forfeitures, or fines, against Fax.com in the amount of $11,000 per violation, for a total of $5,349,000. E-100.

           The FCC noted that Fax.com engaged in a pattern of deception and intimidation to conceal its involvement in sending prohibited faxes and to frustrate consumer’s efforts to exercise the statutory private right of action. E-95. At least one of Fax.com’s employees, Charles Martin, has falsely identified himself in court as “compliance manager” for one of Fax.com’s advertising clients. The FCC found that this deception subverts the judicial decision-making process and skews the statutory private right of action by insuring that the court does not have an accurate record on which to base its decision. E-96. Mr. Martin has also threatened to file counterclaims in California against those seeking redress in other states under the TCPA for unsolicited faxes sent by Fax.com. E-96. Mr. Martin has also issued threatening letters to fax recipients seeking redress for faxes under the TCPA, using the return address of the advertisers, rather than that of Fax.com, his true employer. In some of these cases the postmark on the advertiser’s envelope was from Alisa Viejo, California, Fax.com’s corporate headquarters, rather than the advertiser’s true location. Fax.com’s deception is part of a concerted effort to discourage private enforcement actions under the TCPA. E-97.

Faxcasting

           Fax.com uses “war dialing” or “fax-casting” to automatically dial all telephone numbers within an exchange, testing for fax lines, and recording the results in databases of fax numbers. E-99. Fax.com engages individuals to subscribe to additional telephone lines, and to house war dialing or fax-casting equipment (Faxcaster) tied to those lines in their residences. E-100; E-72-74. The host may not comprehend that the machine will conduct fax-casting. E-72, ¶5.

           One name used for registration of telephone lines tied to a Faxcaster is “Robert Battaglia,” which has thus appeared in the Caller ID windows of recipients of Faxcaster calls. Irate recipients of the Faxcaster calls responded by placing calls to “Robert Battaglia.” As shown by the Affidavits of Robert and Deborah Battaglia of Parkville, Maryland, both were hounded and puzzled by the irate calls they received, as they had no knowledge of the Faxcaster activity that caused the nuisance in the first place. E-68a-71.

           In a unique analysis of a Fax.com Faxcaster, Steven Todd Kirsch, an expert in computer software and hardware holding degrees in electrical engineering and computer science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and himself a “dot-com” success story, downloaded data from two Fax.com Faxcasters. E-72-74. He examined the data and determined that the Faxcaster units conduct two functions: fax marketing, in which they broadcast thousands facsimile transmissions, and fax-casting, in which they dial all 9,999 numbers in each targeted telephone exchange and detect and store the fax numbers. E-73. Faxcaster data showing the transmissions sent is apparently deleted from the Faxcaster within a few days, which is enough time for data on thousands of transmissions to accumulate. E-73, ¶9. Mr. Kirsch received Faxcaster calls at his home in San Jose, California from “Robert Battaglia” (per his caller ID), and each of those calls was routed to his home fax machine, which received advertisements showing a Fax.com removal number. E-74. Thus, the name “Robert Battaglia” has been used for Fax.com’s Faxcaster calls or fax transmissions at least to numbers in Maryland and San Jose, California.

Fax.com Records

           Fax.com invoices its clients for fax transmissions. For example, 8,986 fax transmissions cost $5,669.02, plus $75 job set-up fee, for a total of $5,744.02 (E-110); or 767,283 fax transmissions shown in Fax.com’s invoice at E-118. Fax.com receives payment from its clients pursuant to these billings, sometimes including a voucher that identifies the payment amount, invoice date, invoice number and Fax.com’s payee. E-110-a.

           Fax.com uses a form entitled “Profile Results and Campaign Submittal Form” that shows the “Fax Count Number” (e.g. 132,500) and the “profile/campaign name” (E.g. “Baltimore_1228kv”), and includes other information including the “drop date”, the “time frame,” the “No. paid for,” and the schedule for faxing by batches. (e.g. Two batches of 5,000 to be sent at 7:00 a.m. and each hour thereafter until 12:00 noon, and a similar schedule the following day). E-111-113. Fax.com can list for a costumer the quantity of available fax numbers in Fax.com’s database for selected cities or regions (e.g. Annapolis: 4,335; Baltimore: 25, 293; ... Ellicott City: 2,266, etc.). E-114. Fax.com uses an Artwork/Layout Approval Form to communicate with its advertising customer on layout and approval of artwork. E-115-117. A final, approved layout for the advertisement is marked “completed.” E-117. A Sales Order identifies the “service provided (“fax broadcasting”), the range of dates for the broadcasts, the “block units” (“443,642"), the rate per unit and the total cost. This form is signed by the customer and faxed to Fax.com. E-119-120. Fax.com also has a standard fax broadcasting agreement that it enters with its advertising customer (E-124-125), and an Indemnity Agreement. E-126.

           Despite Petitioner’s discovery requests covering the above described documents, and the discovery orders issued by the court, the Fax.com documents described above were not produced in the instant case. Their existence was known or obtained from other litigation and other sources through counsel’s efforts. While waiting for a ruling on discovery during one of Petitioner’s later discovery motions, Petitioner advised the Court of the types of documents to be expected. E-107. The dismissal under Ponte occurred before a ruling was made on that motion.

           Fax.com was uncooperative and evasive in discovery throughout this case, requiring several discovery motions and orders. E-25, E-28, E-30, and R. at Docket #0078000. Fax.com has been repeatedly sanctioned for discovery failures in other TCPA fax litigation. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Petitioners’ Motion to Compel Respondents Fax.com, Inc. and JD&T Enterprises, Inc. to Produce Documents, R. at Docket # 001600, p. 2.

           Petitioner sought in discovery to obtain the databases used by Respondents as “target data” and “results data” for the fax transmissions, as well as the quantity of transmissions sent into Maryland. Despite the discovery motions and orders, this data was never formally produced by Respondents. However, in a letter marked “for settlement purposes only” Respondents disclosed the quantity of facsimile transmissions into Maryland during a single month of the particular travel fax advertisement received by Petitioner Levitt. Petitioners challenge the propriety of shrouding this discovery data, which by all rights should have been produced much earlier in response to discovery requests and orders, under the guise of a settlement communication. These issues are addressed in the Memorandum in Support of Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration dated February 26^th, 2003, R. at Docket #0100001, which is not included in the Record Extract because of Respondents’ challenge to disclosure of the quantity data on transmissions into Maryland.

Unsolicited faxes in Maryland

           Unsolicited advertisements via facsimile have provoked complaints by recipients to the Attorney General of Maryland. These complaints demonstrate the annoyance created by receipt of these faxes, and the recipients’ frustration at the failure of the senders to delete recipients’ fax numbers upon request. (See samples at E-145-157) (“I have tried to deal with this problem myself but feel that I am making no headway . . .” E-147; “I have requested that the enclosed people remove our fax number about seven times over the past few weeks, but I still keep getting these faxes . . . . E-150). The Attorney General does not get involved in “business-to-business complaints” and directs businesses that receive unsolicited faxes to the Better Business Bureau for assistance. E-146A.

V.                  ARGUMENT

           A.       State courts have no constitutional authority to “opt out” of a federal law and may not reject state court jurisdiction over private TCPA actions unless barred by a neutral rule of court administration.

                      1. TCPA background related to unsolicited fax advertisements

           The Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (TCPA) creates a private right of action against the senders of unsolicited advertisements via facsimile. Under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) the recipient of such an unsolicited advertisement may file suit in state court “if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of [that] State” to obtain monetary or injunctive relief as provided in (b)(3) of the TCPA.

           Congress passed the TCPA in 1991 to "protect the privacy interests of residential telephone subscribers by placing restrictions on unsolicited, automated telephone calls to the home and to facilitate interstate commerce by restricting certain uses of facsimile machines and automatic dialers.” S. Rep. No. 102-178, at 1 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N.1968 (emphasis added).

           The “junk fax” restrictions of the TCPA addressed complaints from business owners that faxes were interfering with their business operations. The comments of members of Congress at the 1991 hearings bear this out. See, e.g. H. R. Rep. No. 102-317 (1991) at 25 ("[B]usinesses have begun to express concern about the interference, interruptions and expense that junk faxes have placed upon them..."); 137 Cong. Rec. S9840-02 (Daily ed. July 11, 1991, statement of Sen. Hollings) "These junk fax advertisements can be a severe impediment to carrying out legitimate business practices and ought to be abolished." 137 Cong. Rec. S16207, daily ed. November 7, 1991 (statement of Sen. Inouye). Senator Bentsen commented that advertisers "must learn not to tie up the telephone or fax lines of businesses without prior consent," and further stated, "[W]e must enact this bill in order to avoid the unreasonable interference with ... the normal conduct of public and private business." Id. Another member stated:

Simply put, the problem is this: Unsolicited advertising is beginning to clog fax lines, restricting the owner's ability to use their machines for the purposes they are originally bought for and generating operating costs the users can't control. Unlike junk mail, which can be discarded, or solicitation of phone calls, which can be reused or hung up, junk fax ties up the recipient's line until it has been received and printed. The recipient's machine is unavailable for business and he or she incurs a high cost for supplies before knowing whether the message is either wanted or needed.

135 Cong. Rec. E1462 (daily ed. May 2, 1989) (Statement of Rep. Markey).

           The adverse effects on business caused by unsolicited faxes were well recognized when the TCPA was enacted. Therefore, “Congress designed a remedy that would take into account the difficult to quantify business interruption costs imposed upon recipients of unsolicited fax advertisements, effectively deter the unscrupulous practice of shifting these costs to unwitting recipients of "junk faxes", and "provide adequate incentive for an individual plaintiff to bring suit on his own behalf." Kenro, Inc. v. Fax Daily, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1162, 1165 (S. D. Ind. 1997).

           The government has a substantial interest in preventing advertisers from unfairly shifting advertising costs to consumers and "return[ing] a measure of control to ... owners of facsimile machines." H.R.Rep. No. 317, at 6. Because "unsolicited commercial fax solicitations are responsible for the bulk of advertising cost shifting ... banning them is a reasonable means to achieve Congress' goal of reducing cost shifting." Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. Federal Communications Commission, 46 F. 3d 54, at 56 (9th Cir.1995). The earlier decision in that case stated that:

Congress' interest in protecting consumers from the economic harm resulting from the 'unfair shifting of the cost of advertising from the advertiser to the unwitting customer' and other harms that could be associated with unsolicited fax solicitations (unsolicited faxes can interfere with a machine's use) is a substantial interest which is identified in the TCPA's legislative history.

Destination Ventures, 844 F. Supp. 632, 637 (D. Or. 1994).

           Rapid advances in computer and telecommunications technology have spawned a large and very efficient fax broadcasting industry. This has in turn has led to several appellate decisions under the TCPA in recent years, all of which (except one discussed infra which was later rejected by a higher court in that state) recognize the federal cause of action in state court. The ruling by the Court of Special Appeals (CSA) in the Ponte case, denying such private actions, is an anomaly, and “frustrates” and “undermines” the General Assembly’s intent to protect citizens from unsolicited faxes. (Brief of the State of Maryland as Amicus Curie in Support of the Petitioner in Ponte, pp. 2, 3).

2. The Supremacy Clause of the U. S. Constitution and Article 2 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights compel state courts to hear actions brought under federal statutes, including the TCPA

           State courts have an original obligation to hear cases under federal law like the TCPA under the Supremacy Clause, which is binding upon states, courts, judges and the people. The Supremacy Clause states that:

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.

Supremacy Clause, U.S. Constitution, art. VI, § 2 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has stated this proposition repeatedly, inter alia, in McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 29 (1990): “State courts must interpret and enforce faithfully the ‘supreme Law of the Land’ and their decisions are subject to review by [the Supreme] Court.”

           The Maryland Declaration of Rights recognizes this same fundamental constitutional concept:

The Constitution of the United States, and the Laws made, or which shall be made, in pursuance thereof, and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, are, and shall be the Supreme Law of the State; and the Judges of this State, and all the People of this State, are, and shall be bound thereby; anything in the Constitution or Law of this State to the contrary notwithstanding.

Md. Declaration of Rights, Art. 2, as quoted in Robinson v. Bunch, 367 Md. 432, 442 at n.7, 788 A. 2d 636 (2002) (emphasis in original).

           States are presumed to have concurrent jurisdiction over federal claims, with few exceptions: “the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction can be rebutted by an explicit statutory directive, by unmistakable implication from legislative history, or by a clear incompatibility between state-court jurisdiction and federal interests.” Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 (1981). Since there is no explicit direction in the TCPA or its legislative history to divest states of jurisdiction, or any clear incompatibility problems, states are presumed to have concurrent jurisdiction. The concurrent jurisdiction created by the TCPA is in a sense split, with state attorney general and FCC enforcement actionable in federal court, 47 U.S.C. § 227(f), and private citizen suits actionable in state court, 47 U.S.C. §§ 227(b)(3) and (c)(5).

           When Congress acts pursuant to its lawful power, it establishes policy for all: “That policy is as much the policy of [the state] as if the act had emanated from its own legislature, and should be respected accordingly in the courts of the state.” Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co. 223 U.S. 1, 57 (1912). A unanimous Supreme Court stated that “The federal law is law in the State as much as laws passed by the state legislature.” Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 380 (1990). In other words, the TCPA should be read, analyzed and interpreted just as if the Maryland Legislature itself had passed the TCPA.

           The duty of state courts to apply federal law is inherent in our nation’s constitutional system of government. See, e.g., Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 389-90 (1947); Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 340 (1816). Consequently, when Congress acts within its enumerated powers to create a federal cause of action, even one that imposes liability on the states themselves, state courts of general jurisdiction may not refuse to hear the federal claim. Id. (reversing a state court’s refusal to enforce the double damage provisions of the Emergency Price Control Act).

           A State’s assertion of sovereign immunity can not alter the duty of State courts to enforce federal law that imposes liability on the states when that law has been validly enacted pursuant to Congress’s enumerated powers. Notably, Howlett made clear that a state may not refuse to hear a federal cause of action by relying upon state law based sovereign immunity or by claiming a lack of jurisdiction due to sovereign immunity. Howlett, 496 U.S. at 378-83; Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. at 393 (“state court cannot ‘refuse to enforce the right arising from the law of the United States because of conceptions of impolicy or want of wisdom on the part of Congress in having called into play its lawful powers.’”) (quoting Minneapolis & St.Louis R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. at 222).

           In Howlett the Court was asked to decide whether common-law sovereign immunity was available to a state school board to preclude a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The state court had dismissed the lawsuit on grounds that the school board, as an arm of the state, had not waived its sovereign immunity in §1983 cases. The Supreme Court noted that the dismissal in state court raised concern that the state may be evading federal law and discriminating against federal causes of action. The Supreme Court held that state common-law immunity could not defeat a claim under a federal statute:

Federal law is enforceable in state courts not because Congress has determined that federal courts would otherwise be burdened or that state courts might provide a more convenient forum — although both might well be true — but because the Constitution and law passed pursuant to it are as much laws in the States as laws passed by the state legislature.

Howlett, 496 U.S. at 367. Accordingly, a state may refuse to enforce a federal statute against a state agency under very limited circumstances. See id. at 369-72. “A state court may not deny a federal right, when the parties are properly before it, in the absence of a ‘valid excuse.’” Id. at 369 (quoting Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 279 U.S. 377 (1929)). An excuse that is “inconsistent with or violates federal law is not a valid excuse.” Howlett, 496 U.S. at 371. “When Congress, in the exertion of the power confided to it by the Constitution, adopted the act, it spoke for all the people and all the States and thereby established a policy for all.” Id. The “valid excuse” exemption simply restates prior law: unless an “unmistakably clear” exception is spelled out in the statute, state courts have jurisdiction over actions to enforce federal statutes. Will v. Mich. Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989).

3. Congressional intent to limit state court jurisdiction over enforcement actions brought under federal statutes, on substantive grounds, rather than neutral rules of court administration, must be “unmistakably clear.”

           A departure from the long-established constitutional balance between state and federal interests including state respect for duly promulgated federal laws may occur only where Congress has unambiguously stated its intention to alter the ordinary constitutional design. Will v. Mich. Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. at 65 (1989) (“If Congress intends to alter the usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government, it must make its intention to do so unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.”) (citations omitted) (emphasis added); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971) (“unless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state balance”); United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33-34 (1992) (“Waivers of the Government’s sovereign immunity, to be effective, must be ‘unequivocally expressed’”), Kilroy v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. App 4th 793, 817-818 (1997) (quoting Will and Bass).

           Justice O’Connor noted that the clear statement rule concept is not just a canon of statutory construction, but since it effects the constitutional balance of powers between federal and state sovereigns, is one which “derives from the Constitution itself.” Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Rys. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 197, 209 (1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Allowing a state veto power over a federal law alters and upsets the foundation of federal supremacy, and upsetting this foundation requires explicitly clear direction from Congress. State rejection of federal law would be an unconstitutional and invalid act, so congressional approval must be unmistakably clear. Maine v. Taylor 477 U.S. 131, 139 (1986) (“An unambiguous indication of congressional intent is required before a federal statute will be read to authorize otherwise invalid state legislation.”); C&C Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 408 (1994) (“Congress must be ‘unmistakably clear’ before we will conclude that it intended to permit state regulation which would otherwise violate the dormant Commerce Clause.”) (O’Connor, J. concurring). This clear and explicit Congressional statement is required whether it is Congress or the state that will be the body which is divesting state courts from their presumed original jurisdiction over federal laws.         It is possible for Congress to permit the states to engage in practices otherwise unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138. However, anyone seeking to establish that Congress intended states to engage in an otherwise unconstitutional act face a heavy burden: “Parties seeking to argue that Congress has authorized the otherwise invalid [state] legislation face a heavy burden.” Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina, 945 F.2d 781, 790 (1990). The clear statement rule ensures “that the legislature has in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the critical matters involved in the judicial decision.” United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971). The TCPA’s legislative history is devoid of the supporting debate, committee report or deliberative record created by Congress necessary to satisfy the clear statement rule. Sen. Hollings’ statement that Congress could not constitutionally dictate to states how to administer private TCPA actions indicates that any intent of Congress was to avoid the constitutional thicket, not dive into and alter it.

           The TCPA’s jurisdictional language “if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State” falls far short of the unambiguous and “clear statement” required to alter the constitutional federal-state balance. This language lacks the force and clarity needed to overcome the Supreme Court’s repeated and long-standing interpretation of the Supremacy Clause to mandate state court jurisdiction over suits to enforce federal statutes.

           4.        The TCPA’s “if otherwise permitted” language refers to neutral rules or laws governing court administration and procedures

           In the absence of a any clear statement or congressional record to support upsetting the state-federal constitutional balance, and in light of Sen. Hollings’ statements, the language “if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court or a State” can only be understood to be directed at state court procedures and administration.

           Balancing the Supremacy Clause against states’ rights under the Tenth Amendment, it is clear that federal legislation cannot alter a state’s procedural law in order to vest jurisdiction in state court. There is no requirement under the Supremacy Clause that a state create a court competent to hear the case in which the federal claim is presented. The general rule, “bottomed deeply in belief in the importance of state control of state judicial procedure, is that federal law takes the state courts as it finds them.” Howlett, supra, 496 U.S. at 372 (quoting Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 489, 508 (1954)); see also Claflin v. Housemann, 93 U.S. 130, 137 (1876) (federal claims may be prosecuted in state courts “competent to decide rights of the like character and class” unless Congress grants federal courts exclusive jurisdiction); see also Biggerstaff, State Courts and the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991: Must States Opt-in? Can States Opt-out? 33 Conn. L. Rev. 404 (2001).

           The Supremacy Clause requires state courts to accept jurisdiction over suits to enforce federal statutes unless prevented by a “neutral rule of judicial administration” (Howlett, supra, 496 U.S. at 374) - a procedural rule - that bars state and federal claims equally, without discrimination. See, e.g., Missouri ex rel. Southern R. Co. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1 (1950) (state court could refuse to hear federal cause of action where forum non conveniens applied evenhandedly to state and federal claims); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945) (no state court jurisdiction where venue laws evenly applied); Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 279 U.S. 377 (1929) (no jurisdiction where state statute permitted discretionary dismissal of either a state or a federal claim when neither the plaintiff nor the defendant was a State resident); see also Howlett, supra, 496 U.S. at 378 (“This case does not present the questions whether Congress can require the States to create a forum with the capacity to enforce federal statutory rights or to authorize service of process on parties who would not otherwise be subject to the court’s jurisdiction.”).

           The true operative question the “if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court” language raises is whether the Circuit Court’s jurisdiction is barred by “a neutral state rule regarding the administration of the courts” (Howlett, supra, 496 U.S. at p. 372), and not whether there is a state law that evinces a conflicting policy on the substantive provisions of the TCPA, as the CSA incorrectly decided. The answer for this class action and all TCPA cases in Maryland is an unqualified no.

           Maryland examples illustrating how neutral rules of administration that could preclude TCPA claims include filing a TCPA claim for injunctive relief under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A) in a Maryland District Court which Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (CJP) §4-402(a) precludes because it divests the District Court of general equity jurisdiction; the filing in small claims court of a TCPA suit for multiple violations and statutory damages which exceed the small claims jurisdictional limit; the filing of a TCPA suit in a county in which none of the parties reside or carry on a course of business, employment or vocation and otherwise fail to meet the venue requirements of CJP §§6-201 and 202; and the filing of a TCPA suit against a defendant having insufficient contacts with Maryland to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction under Maryland’s long-arm statute, CJP § 6-103.

           Rejection of private TCPA suits filed in state courts may occur only via neutral rules of general administration such as those just described. Private TCPA suits for fax violations can not and do not require alteration of any of Maryland’s “laws or rules of court.” See Howlett, supra, 496 U.S. at p. 373 (finding state court jurisdiction proper and noting the “significance” of the fact “‘that Congress had not attempted ‘to enlarge or regulate the jurisdiction of state courts or to control or affect their modes of procedure.’” (quoting Mondou, supra, 223 U.S. at p. 56).

           The phrase, “A person or entity may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State, bring [an action under the TCPA] in an appropriate court of that State . . .” (47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)) simply incorporates existing constitutional jurisprudence and does not enlarge or constrict the neutral rules of Maryland court administration. Although federal law is generally enforceable in state court, it takes the state courts “as it finds them.” The language of the TCPA requiring that claims be brought in “an appropriate court of that state” abides by this principle. Sen. Hollings, the TCPA’s sponsor, emphasized the point: “The bill does not, because of constitutional constraints, dictate to the States which court in each State shall be the proper venue for such action, as this is a matter for State legislators to determine.” 137 Cong. Rec. S. 16,205 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (Sen. Hollings) (emphasis added). Thus, the phrase at issue merely acknowledges that states have the right to structure their own court systems and that state courts are not obligated to change their procedural rules to accommodate TCPA claims. Schulman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 710 N.Y.S.2d 368, 372 (N.Y. App. 2000). This interpretation avoids the constitutional issues discussed supra, and courts should avoid reaching a constitutional question if a non-constitutional question is dispositive of the issue. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 577 (1978).

           A state court must entertain a claim arising under federal law “when its ordinary jurisdiction as prescribed by local laws is appropriate to the occasion and is invoked in conformity with those laws.” Mondou, supra, 223 U.S. at pp. 56-57 (emphasis added). “Under these circumstances the State courts are not free to refuse enforcement of petitioners’ claim.” Testa, supra, 330 U.S. at p. 394. “The Federal Constitution prohibits state courts of general jurisdiction from refusing to [entertain federal claims] solely because the suit is brought under a federal law.” McKnett v. St. Louis & Sun Francisco R. Co., 292 U.S. 230, 233-234 (1934).

           The jurisdiction of Maryland courts is “appropriate to the occasion,” under Mondou, supra. The courts of this state routinely enforce actions for civil damages, including actions filed under federal statutes, some of which provide for multiple (double or treble) damages. See, e.g., Robinson v. Bunch, supra. Maryland courts thus entertain the “same type of claim” as those under the TCPA, and there exists “jurisdiction adequate and appropriate under established local law to adjudicate this action.” Id.; see Howlett, supra, 496 U.S. at 373-374.